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The purpose of this study was to explore whether children with autism display selectivity in 
social learning.  We investigated the processing of word-mappings provided by speakers who 
differed on previously demonstrated accuracy and on potential degree of reliability in three 
groups of children (children with Autism Spectrum Disorder, children with Developmental 
Language Disorder and typically developing children) aged 4 to 9.  In Task 1, one speaker 
consistently misnamed familiar objects and the second speaker consistently gave correct 
names.  In Task 2, both speakers provided correct information but differed on how they could 
achieve this accuracy.   
We analyzed how the speakers’ profiles influence children’s decisions to rely on them in order 
to learn novel words.  We also examined how children attended to the speakers’ testimony by 
tracking their eye movements and comparing children’ gaze distribution across speakers’ faces 
and objects of their choice.   
Results show that children rely on associative trait attribution heuristics to selectively learn 
from accurate speakers.  In Task 1, children in all groups preferred the novel object selected by 
accurate speakers and directly avoided information provided by previously inaccurate 
speakers, as revealed by the eye-tracking data.  In Task 2, where a more sophisticated reasoning 
about speakers’ reliability was required, only children in the typically developing group 
performed above chance.  Non-verbal intelligence score emerged as a predictor of children’s 
preference for more reliable informational sources.  Additionally, children with autism 
exhibited reduced attention to speakers’ faces compared to children in the comparison groups. 
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Most situations in which children acquire new words are highly ambiguous.  A great number 
of objects or properties can potentially correspond to an unknown word, especially because the 
intended referent is almost never presented in isolation.  It is therefore relatively unsurprising 
that children take into account various social cues to determine the meaning of new words.  For 
instance, tracking a parent’s attention focus is a powerful social cue to determine the reference 
of her or his utterances (Akhtar & Tomasello, 2000; Baldwin, 1995). 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterized by impaired social functioning and 
communication, as well as by stereotyped and repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Children with ASD are known to display difficulty in adequately tracking 
and understanding the communicative intentions of people around them (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1985; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).  It 
has been suggested that because the ability to map words onto meanings requires attending to 
social cues, such the speaker’s gaze, social deficits may impact word learning in ASD (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  According to this view, lexical deficits and delays 
that are often attested in children with ASD could stem from a limited capacity to follow and 
understand social cues.  In line with this hypothesis, unlike their TD peers, children with ASD 
show a tendency to map words onto referents located within their own attentional focus, rather 
than on those attended by the speaker (Parish-Morris, Hennon, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2007; Preissler & Carey, 2005).  However, these conclusions have been 
challenged by a series of more recent eye-tracking studies, in which children and adults with 
ASD proved sensitive to the direction of the experimenter’s gaze in word mapping tasks (Bean 
Ellawadi & McGregor, 2016; Franken, Lewis, & Malone, 2010; Luyster & Lord, 2009; 
McGregor, Rost, Arenas, Farris-Trimble, & Stiles, 2013; Norbury, Griffiths, & Nation, 2010).  
It thus appears that children with ASD do take speakers into account — to a certain extent, at 
least — when they acquire and process language. 
A promising way to gain better insights into the role social understanding plays in 
vocabulary acquisition is to investigate whether social cues in word-learning situations are 
treated by children in ASD in a flexible way.  A child’s lexical repertoire is drawn from multiple 
sources, some of which can be misleading.  Speakers may mispronounce some words because 
they are not fully fluent in the language they speak to the child; others may lack the relevant 
expertise; still others may try to deliberately deceive the child or make jokes.  This variation in 
reliability creates a pressure to be selective about which information sources are indeed 
trustworthy.  A beneficial strategy for a child who acquires language would thus be to rely on 
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the cues offered by reliable sources, but disregard misleading informants.  A large body of 
research on selective learning in TD infants and preschoolers provides evidence for such 
flexible use of social information (see for reviews Mills, 2013; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013).  Even 
very young children frequently modulate their word learning strategies according to previously 
demonstrated behaviors of informants: they selectively choose to learn words from speakers 
who described themselves as knowledgeable (Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001) or who demonstrated 
accurate lexical knowledge (Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004).  Selective learning has been 
classically studied using a paradigm by Koenig et al. \(2004), where children witness (directly 
or through video recording) two speakers who provide labels for familiar referents, with one 
speaker systematically mislabeling the objects (for example calling a spoon a cup) and another 
providing the correct labels.  Next, children are presented with an unfamiliar object, for which 
both speakers provide conflicting labels; crucially, children appear to display a robust 
preference for the label used by the accurate speaker.  Multiple subsequent studies 
demonstrated that early selective trust extends beyond the language domain to other learning 
situations in which an adult’s testimony serves as a major source of information (Birch, 
Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Harris, Koenig, Corriveau, & Jaswal, 2018).   
While evidence for the preference for reliable informants in childhood is ubiquitous, 
explanations for these results in typical development are not yet firmly established, and the 
extent to which they reflect genuine understanding of speakers’ trustworthiness is still a matter 
of controversy (Birch et al., 2017; Poulin-Dubois & Brosseau-Liard, 2016).  One possible 
explanation, in line with socio-pragmatic accounts of language learning, would be that, from 
early developmental stages, children detect and rely on speaker’s mental states.  Under this line 
of thought, preschoolers use social information in a flexible way by making inferences about 
speaker’s epistemic state and choosing to trust adults who had demonstrated that they may 
possess the relevant evidence (Koenig & Harris, 2007; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013).   
An alternative — and conflicting — explanation, however, is that selective learning is 
rooted in a less sophisticated associative mechanism.  According to this line of thought, 
children attribute surface traits to speakers based on their observations of these speakers’ 
previous behavior.  It is quite exceptional to witness speakers mislabeling objects around them.  
Since such behavior may be perceived as highly anomalous, it could be that children simply 
bypass information coming from inaccurate speakers.  Reliable speakers would thus be held 
generally knowledgeable — rather than situationally informed — because they do not exhibit 
the odd behavior characteristic of an inaccurate speaker (Lucas & Lewis, 2010).   
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Whereas socio-pragmatic explanations entail that child genuinely processes speakers’ 
knowledge states, associative responses rest on nothing more than simple global rejection of 
the unconventional behavior demonstrated by inaccurate speakers.  Children’s preference for 
the information associated with an accurate speaker would not arise from rational inference 
about her expertise, but is simply induced by a rejection of inaccurate speakers.  Thus, even 
though a preference for accurate speakers may misleadingly appear as a rational choice, it may 
simply result from a surface trait attribution, which leads to the rejection of inaccurate speakers.  
In other situations, in which children erroneously rely on irrelevant attributes, superficial trait 
attribution process may result in irrational trusting behavior.  For instance, preschoolers were 
found to selectively learn words from attractive, nice and strong speakers rather than from 
unattractive, mean and weaker ones, even when the former were wrong (Bascandziev & Harris, 
2014; Fusaro, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013). 
To assess the potential implication of mental state understanding in selective learning, 
one could examine correlations between children’s performance on standard Theory of mind 
tasks and tasks on speakers’ reliability.  However, currently available results are inconclusive, 
with some researchers reporting moderate correlations (Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & Poulin-
Dubois, 2015; DiYanni, Nini, Rheel, & Livelli, 2012) and other finding no correlation at all 
(Brosseau-Liard, Iannuzziello, & Varin, 2018; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007).  
To investigate the impact of speaker’s trustworthiness on language acquisition in ASD, a 
clinical group with robustly documented difficulties in perspective-taking and mentalizing may 
provide a more direct insight into the nature of selective learning. 
Recall that there is ample evidence that individuals with ASD have limited abilities in 
tracking the mental states of others during interaction.  If selective learning is rooted into 
mentalizing abilities, as held by the proponents of socio-pragmatic theories, one should expect 
children with ASD to fail to display selective learning based on their misunderstanding of 
speakers’ epistemic statuses.  If, however, children’s learning strategies in tasks in which they 
prefer learning from previously accurate speakers rely on a more general associative 
mechanism, then children with ASD could prove as sensitive as TD children to speakers’ 
previous accuracy. 
It is also possible that in some situations of social learning, TD children spontaneously 
engage in mental state reasoning, but also use less sophisticated mechanisms in other situations.  
A dual-processing account of selective trust proposes that children simultaneously use two 
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kinds of underlying cognitive process: one unsophisticated and fast mechanism that is driven 
by trait attribution and one slow process requiring situational inference-making strategies 
(Hermes, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2018).  Importantly, these two mechanisms may co-exist and 
operate in parallel as determined by situational context; it is also likely that a more sophisticated 
process will appear later during child development. 
One way to determine whether a nuanced understanding of epistemic reasoning is 
available to young children is to expose them to speakers who demonstrate the same degree of 
accuracy on the surface but differ in the way they achieve this accuracy.  For example, Nurmsoo 
& Robinson (2009) found that preschoolers fail to take into account the difference in 
information access between two speakers.  In this study, children showed no preference for 
speakers who had excusable reason for erring (blindfolded speakers) over speakers who had 
no obvious excuse for being inaccurate.  However, in another study (Kondrad & Jaswal, 2012), 
4- and 5-year old were found to overlook semantic errors that were closer to being correct (e.g.  
the mislabeling of a comb as a brush rather than as a thunderstorm) when the speaker’s errors 
could be excused.  Likewise, Einav & Robinson (2011) report that by the age of 4, children are 
sensitive to the conditions under which accuracy is achieved.  In this study, children were 
presented with two speakers, who both correctly named familiar objects; however, while one 
needed help to do so, the other reached correct labels without being helped.  4-year-olds (but 
not 3-year-olds) displayed preference for the novel labels that were offered by the latter 
speaker.  Age was also found to predict children’s ability to prioritize the accuracy of a speaker 
over her confidence in learning situations (Brosseau-Liard, Cassels, Birch, & Senju, 2014).  
These results suggest that the mechanisms involved in selective learning may be situation-
dependent and evolve across development, with more sophisticated inference-based 
mechanisms appearing only later. 
Nuanced social selective learning may also remain challenging for younger preschoolers 
because in such tasks children would have to make inferences at two parallel levels (Landrum, 
Eaves, & Shafto, 2015).  Learning accurate information from others requires drawing 
inferences both about speakers’ state of knowledge and about the information, they provide.  
In other words, learners must apply their assumptions about the speakers’ epistemic state to 
make inferences about object-referent pairs.  One could argue that failure to learn words 
selectively by younger children in more complex contexts does not follow so much from a 
difficulty to evaluate speakers’ epistemic statuses, as from a difficulty to apply this information 
while reasoning about which of two available referents should be associated with a novel word.   
7 
AN EYE-TRACKING STUDY OF SELECTIVE TRUST DEVELOPMENT  
Independently of the reason why sophisticated processing of social cues is not entirely in 
place in younger typically developing children, one should expect it to be unavailable to 
children with ASD.  A number of studies on language processing reported significant 
impairments in context-based inferences in ASD (Bodner, Engelhardt, Minshew, & Williams, 
2015; Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 2001; Happé, 1994).  In addition to difficulties in drawing 
inferences about intentions or mental states (Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996), some studies have 
also reported impaired processing of causal links in non-social events in autism (Mason, 
Williams, Kana, Minshew, & Just, 2008).  Difficulties in drawing context-based inferences 
should prevent children with ASD from taking into account nuanced differences in speakers’ 
behavior and associating it with various degrees of trustworthiness.   
To get more insight into the mechanisms involved in social selective learning, it is 
important to use methods that would not only determine whether children discriminate between 
reliable and less reliable speakers, but also reveal, through a dynamic exploration of social cue 
processing, how children reach their decisions.  To that end, behavioral data on children’s 
performance should be complemented by visual exploration patterns.  It is widely 
acknowledged that visually exploring people’s faces provides with powerful social cues.  For 
instance, one study found that 14-months infants more readily follow the gaze of a reliable vs.  
unreliable experimenter (Chow, Poulin-Dubois, & Lewis, 2008).  Therefore, eye-tracking 
constitutes a promising tool to study selective trust. 
Eye-tracking is especially relevant for our research question, as numerous studies reveal 
that individuals with ASD attend less than their typically developing peers to social stimuli, 
especially when there is a competition between social and non-social information (Kikuchi, 
Senju, Tojo, Osanai, & Hasegawa, 2009; Moore, Heavey, & Reidy, 2012; Riby & Hancock, 
2009).  Furthermore, even when overall distribution of attention to social and non-social stimuli 
is within the typical range, the time course of gaze shifts to important social cues may still 
significantly differ between individuals with and without ASD (Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, 
Benson, Frank, & Findlay, 2009; Kikuchi et al., 2009).   
That said, in studies that explored visual attention in referential tasks, no significant 
group differences were found in the amount of attention allocated to social (eyes and mouth of 
a speaker) versus non-social (target object and distractor) areas of interests between children 
with ASD and TD children (Norbury et al., 2010; Tenenbaum, Amso, Abar, & Sheinkopf, 
2014).  However, the gaze exploration of social and non-social information in a more complex 
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word-learning situation, when two speakers produce conflicting information, has not yet been 
studied.  Furthermore, according to a recent meta-analysis, high social content (corresponding 
to a higher number of people involved in an observed interaction) has been found to be a strong 
predictor of diminished social attention in autism (Chita-Tegmark, 2016).  One could expect 
that children with ASD would be less attracted by socially relevant information in complex 
social scenes, and, for this reason, would experience difficulties in forming expectations about 
speakers’ competence. 
Another factor that can help elucidate the relationships between socio-pragmatic 
processes and selective learning in autism is the choice of control groups.  The most widespread 
method in research on ASD is to recruit comparison groups of TD individuals matched on 
chronological age and/or cognitive abilities — in spite of the fact that children with ASD often 
exhibit a significant delay in language acquisition.  Children with Developmental Language 
Disorder (DLD)2, who usually have vocabulary deficits comparable to those observed in 
children with ASD, arguably constitute a more adequate comparison group for studying word-
learning in autism.  Moreover, such a comparison may help elucidate the role of attention to 
social information in selective learning, since children with DLD have been found to privilege 
socially relevant information in the same way as their TD peers (Hanley et al., 2014).  At the 
same time, children with DLD may exhibit important socio-communicative impairments, 
usually associated with poor language skills (Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2008; St Clair, 
Pickles, Durkin, & Conti-Ramsden, 2011).  Given that both children with ASD and children 
with DLD share similar communication difficulties, but are likely to differ in their processing 
of social cues, comparing these populations may increase our understanding of the mechanisms 
that support selectivity in social learning.   
The study is designed to explore the role of social-pragmatic reasoning in selective 
learning tasks, both in typical and atypical development.  Tasks on selective trust have been 
extensively implemented with TD children and infants but, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study has yet addressed this issue in children with ASD. 
Our aim here is to investigate whether children with ASD can selectively use social cues 
for word learning.  We also considered two alternative theoretical accounts of social selective 
learning: one that explains early sensitivity to information sources, in typical development, by 
 
2  As recommended by Bishop et al. (2017), we use the term Developmental Language Disorder 
(DLD) instead of previously used term Specific Language Impairment (SLI). 
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a precocious capacity to reason about knowledge states of speakers and the other that explains 
this sensitivity by a general surface-trait attribution mechanism.  One way of adjudicating 
between these two positions is to investigating selective social learning in children who show 
impoverished social-pragmatic processing.  Last twenty-five years of research yielded ample 
and robust evidence that individuals with ASD present such a clinical profile.  Given the 
relatively uncontroversial presence of a difficulty in reasoning about other people’s mental 
states in ASD, two antagonistic predictions may be drawn from the two accounts of selective 
learning just evoked.  1) Consistent with the first, inference-based account, children with ASD 
should not be able to use social cues in a flexible way in word-learning situations; they should 
thus display no preference for word-object mappings offered by a previously accurate speaker 
and would perform at chance in ‘classic’ tasks on selective trust; 2) Consistent with the second, 
associative surface-trait attribution account, children with ASD may display selective social 
learning, suggesting that it does not depend on the kind of pragmatic and mentalizing skills 
whose deficits are otherwise attested in this population. 
As seen above, a conservative interpretation of selective learning is that mental state 
reasoning is not required in all word learning situations, so that young children may avoid 
learning from inaccurate speakers through a less sophisticated associative mechanism.  
Therefore, we explore children’s performance in two different word-learning situations.  In a 
first task, we use a set of short videos based on a classic selective trust experiment with two 
speakers, one of whom applies familiar nouns to correct objects, while the other one does so 
systematically to incorrect objects.  In the second task, we use a scenario similar to Einav & 
Robinson (2011)’s, which requires reasoning about speakers’ previous behavior.  In this 
scenario, both speakers give correct answers, but the reliability of the speakers can be assessed 
through the way these accurate responses were achieved: in familiarization trials, one of the 
speakers is systematically assisted by a third party, while the other always makes her lexical 
choices by herself.  In this scenario, in order to evaluate the degree of speakers’ potential 
accuracy, children must build a model of speakers’ epistemic status based on the interaction 
that these speakers previously had with the third party.  Therefore, sensitivity to speakers’ 
competences in such a task cannot be explained by surface-trait attribution mechanism.  
Moreover, an above chance performance in this task would strongly suggest a capacity of 
genuine social-cognitive reasoning.  We predict, therefore, that children with ASD, but not TD 
children, should fail to display selective learning in this complex situation. 
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We also conducted an exploratory study of how children allocate attention during 
learning.  We reasoned that children might differentiate between speakers before they make 
their lexical decisions by diverting their attention away from the demonstration made by the 
unreliable speaker.  To this end, we compared gaze fixations’ patterns associated with 
conflicting mappings made by each speaker during test trial in two tasks.  We predicted that if 
children with ASD fail to differentiate between the two speakers in the tasks, their patterns of 
gaze distribution should differ from the gaze allocation in the DLD and TD group.  In addition 
to examining whether children’s gaze patterns are predicted by the previously demonstrated 
reliability of speakers, this design provides an excellent opportunity to explore whether 
attention to social information — the speaker’s face — during a dynamic learning scenario is 
reduced in the ASD group, as compared to the DLD and TD groups. 
In sum, if selective social learning requires understanding mental states, it should be 
impaired in children with ASD, but not (or at least not to the same extent) in children with 
DLD and in TD children.  However, one should not expect children with ASD to fail to 
discriminate between speakers based on their previous accuracy, if such discrimination is 
associated with surface trait attribution.  To the best of our knowledge, no study has attempted 
to analyze distribution of attention to faces of speakers producing conflicting information in 
word-learning situations.  We fill this gap, and reason that the patterns of attention allocation 
should help understand the final lexical choice made by children in different groups.  Children’s 
attention to the information provided by speakers may vary as a function of speakers’ previous 
accuracy; children should attend more to the novel object-word pairings associated with a 
previously accurate speaker.  We also expect that the pattern of attention distribution will be 
associated with group performance: if children with ASD fail to use the speaker’s epistemic 
status in learning new words, this failure would be associated with an atypical attention 
distribution pattern.   
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
Children with DLD and children with ASD were recruited from special school 
departments for children or by referral from local providers.  Diagnosis in ASD group was 
confirmed by administration of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule to the children 
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) by an accredited assessor.  All participants in the ASD group met 
the ADOS cut-off for autism.  Children in TD groups were recruited from mainstream primary 
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schools.  The absence of ASD in both groups of children with DLD and TD children was 
confirmed by the administration of the Autism Diagnostic Interview Revised (ADI-R; Lord et 
al.,1994) to their parents by an accredited ADI-R and ADOS assessor.  All of the children with 
TD and DLD scored below the exclusionary cut-offs for at least two content areas.  Parental 
informed consent was collected for each child. 
Our final sample included 25 children with a confirmed diagnosis of ASD (mean age (in 
years) = 6,9, range = 4,1–9,0), 32 children with DLD (mean age = 7,3, range = 5,1–9,4) and 20 
TD children (mean age =7,1, range = 4,1–8,8).  An ANOVA indicated no significant 
differences in age among the groups, F (2, 74) =0.31, p=0.73.  One child in the ASD group 
and four children in the DLD group were excluded due to technical issues and experimenters’ 
errors.  
PROCEDURE  
Participation to this study involved two experimental sessions.  In a first session, all 
participants underwent cognitive and language testing.  Non-verbal IQ was measured by the 
composite score of four intelligence subtests (Sequential Order, Form Completion, 
Classification and Analogies and Figure Ground) of the Leiter-3 (Rold, Miller, Pomplun, & 
Koch, 2013), which is particularly suited to assess non-verbal cognitive abilities in populations 
with atypical development.  Receptive vocabulary was measured by the French version of the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test – Revised (Dunn & Theriault-Whalen, 1993).  All children 
included in the final sample were considered cognitively able, achieving IQ scores of 70 or 
above.  Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for all groups.  There was a statistically 
significant diagnostic group effect for nonverbal cognitive abilities (F(2, 74) = 15.01,p < 
.001) and receptive vocabulary (F(2, 74) = 15.76, p < .001).  Post hoc Tukey HSD tests 
revealed that the TD group scored significantly above the ASD and the DLD group on verbal 
and non-verbal scores (ps < 0.01).  The ASD and DLD groups did not significantly differ on 
both measures.   
During the second session, two tasks were performed in a counterbalanced order.  For 
each task, drawings of six familiar objects and two novel objects were used as the target objects.  
Within each task, two sets of live video recordings of a female and a male adult were created.  
In one set (Set 1) the female adult was acting as a ‘reliable speaker’ and correctly designated 
familiar objects; in the second set (Set 2) she acted as an ‘unreliable speaker’ and failed to 
correctly designate familiar objects.  Half of the children were assigned to Set 1 and another 
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half to Set 2.  Children for whom the reliable speaker was a female figure in the first task saw 
a set with a male figure as a more reliable speaker in the second task.  This was done to 
minimize the impact of potential transfer of information about speaker’s reliability from one 
task to another.  Two different pairs of adults were filmed for each task.   
Eye-tracking measures were collected using a portable Tobii X2-60 eye-tracker, 
sampling at 60 Hz.  The device was attached underneath a 16-inch computer touchscreen 
display (full screen mode was used, with a resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels).  Participants were 
seated approximatively 60 cm from the screen.  Their gazes were calibrated using 5-point 
infant-mode procedure before each task. 
SCENARIO OF TASK 1 
Children first watched a video in which the two speakers introduced themselves (e.g.  
‘Hi! My name is Julie’, ‘Hi! My name is Philippe’).  Next, images of two familiar objects were 
displayed on the screen accompanied by a request to designate one of these two objects (e.g.  
‘Where is the truck?).  One of the speakers was asked by her/his name to answer; s/he was 
followed by the second speaker (e.g.  Julie’s turn, Philippe’s turn).  Finally, the child was 
invited to touch an object (‘It’s your turn’).  The two speakers, and then the child, were asked 
to identify the object that they thought corresponded to a pseudo-word.  Figure 1 shows the 
temporal course of one version of the task, with the familiarization and test trials.  Female and 
male speakers acted alternatively as reliable and unreliable speakers in two sets, the order of 
speakers was counterbalanced across sets.  Positions of all pictures on the screen remained 
identical across sets.  There were three familiarization trials with both speakers, so that each 
speaker performed a mapping with familiar objects three times before the test trial.   
SCENARIO OF TASK 2 
Two sets of videos were created for Task 2, using the same counterbalancing method as 
the one described above for Task 1.  The structure of a task was similar to the one used in Task 
1.  However, in this second task, familiarization trials featured three characters, two adults and 
a puppet.  The adults introduced themselves by their names (‘Hi! My name is Pierre.’, ‘Hi! My 
name is Sophie.’); the puppet introduced itself as follows: ‘Hi! My name is Ted and I know a 
lot of things!” Next, as in Task 1, two familiar objects were displayed, along with a request to 
designate one of them.  Figure 2 contains descriptions of the scenarios used in the 
familiarization trials in Task 2. 
13 
AN EYE-TRACKING STUDY OF SELECTIVE TRUST DEVELOPMENT  
Each adult was solicited, in turns, to show the corresponding object; each time, the puppet 
asked the adult whether s/he needed help.  The less reliable speaker always answered that s/he 
would need help; the puppet then moved to the part of the screen where the correct object was 
located, and the adult eventually pointed at it.  The more reliable speaker always replied: ‘No, 
thank you, I’ll keep thinking’, and after a short hesitation designated the correct object.  This 
last feature ensured that the more reliable adult did not appear more confident than the less 
reliable adult, as confidence is another cue children may rely on during selective learning 
(Brosseau-Liard et al., 2014; Matsui, Yamamoto, & McCagg, 2006).  Before the test trial was 
launched, children witnessed the puppet leaving the scene and were told that it could no longer 
help the players.  The structure and the temporal course of the test trial was identical to that of 
Test 1.  Three familiarization videos per speaker were shown, so that six different familiar 
objects in total were indicated by both speakers; the order of these videos was randomized. 
DATA PREPARATION 
Eye-tracking data were analyzed for the test trials in both tasks.  Our aim was to explore 
attention allocation patterns during the word mappings made by reliable and unreliable 
speakers.  We focused on analyses of two segments of the test trials, corresponding to the 2-
seconds intervals during which each speaker showed one of two referents on the board.  The 
beginning of each segment of interest was identified as the onset of the adult name when s/he 
was solicited to provide her/his answer (viz.  It is Julie’s turn), separately for each speaker and 
set.   
To be able to reach valid and reliable conclusions based on the eye-tracking data, 
participants had to have attended to both segments of interest for a substantial amount of time.  
To this end, we defined a 70% available recording’s threshold and included into final analyses 
only those recordings for which participants had at least 1400 s of dwell time on the screen 
detected for each segment of interest.   
In each segment of interest, we defined four areas of interest (AOI).  Two AOIs were 
non-social areas that corresponded to two images of objects displayed on the board, and two 
dynamic social AOIs that were adjusted frame by frame to capture all fixations on the faces of 
speakers (see Fig.3).   
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RESULTS  
TASK 1 
All analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2017).  Generalized linear models 
were fitted using the glm function and linear mixed-effects models were fitted using the lmer 
function in the lme4 library of R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015).   
We began by analyzing the accuracy of participant’s responses.  Sixteen over 20 children 
in the TD group, 25 over 32 in the DLD group and 18 over 24 children in the ASD group 
pointed at the object selected by the reliable speaker at the end of the test trial.  Response 
accuracy in each group was significantly above chance (binomial test, p<0.05).   
All tested children in our sample were cognitively able and displayed sufficient verbal 
comprehension level; nevertheless, there was a significant difference in non-verbal and verbal 
IQ between each clinical group and the group of TD children.  That is why, we also explored 
whether receptive vocabulary and non-verbal IQ were predictors of children’s choice.  As prior 
research has found that children’s selectivity may also vary as a function of age, age was also 
included as a predictor in these analyses. 
A generalized linear model was run with group, age, receptive vocabulary and non-verbal 
IQ as predictors, and the binomial measure of preference as response variable.  Analyses 
revealed significant main effects of receptive vocabulary (χ2(1)  = 8.14, p =.004) and non-
verbal IQ: (χ2(1)  = 10.51, p =.001).  The models containing age (χ2(1) = 2.26, p =0.92) and 
group (χ2(2) = 0.16, p =0.13) as fixed effects did not differ significantly from the null model.  
Therefore, at the group level, children with ASD, children with DLD and TD children 
performed equally well.  Unsurprisingly, failures in this task were associated with low verbal 
and non-verbal IQ skills.   
Next, we explored the pattern of children’s attention allocation in the test trial for two 
segments of interest that corresponded to the demonstrations performed by the reliable and the 
unreliable speakers.  Sufficient quantity of eye-tracking data for each segment of interest 
(>70%) in Task 1 was available for 15 children in the TD group (M=95.5, sd= 8.7), 20 children 
in the DLD group (M=94.2, sd=9.5) and 18 children in the ASD group (M=89.2, sd=11.3).  
Within each segment, the object that was shown by a speaker was coded as Indicated object 
and the speaker who performed the mapping was coded as Active speaker; the second object 
and second speaker were coded respectively as Other object and Inactive speaker.  Speakers 
15 
AN EYE-TRACKING STUDY OF SELECTIVE TRUST DEVELOPMENT  
and objects were counterbalanced across these areas of interests in two segments according to 
the roles performed by the speakers. 
We calculated proportion of fixations for each AOI in the two segments of interest by 
dividing the total number of fixations within each AOI by the total number of fixations on the 
screen (see Fig.  4).  We analyzed gaze data with linear mixed effect models with by-participant 
random intercepts.  We built a linear mixed model with proportion of fixations as the predicted 
variable and area of interest as the predictor variable.  We performed a likelihood ratio test of 
the model containing the fixed effect of area of interest against a null model, which had the 
same random effects structure but did not include the fixed AOI factor.  A significant effect of 
area of interest was detected (χ2(3) = 188.7, p < 0.001).  By contrast, neither the fixed group 
effect (χ2(2) = 0.97, p = 0.61) nor the AOI × group interaction (χ2(6) = 5.21, p = 0.51) improved 
the fit relative to the null model. 
There was an interaction between segment (Reliable vs Unreliable speaker) and AOI 
(χ2(3) = 46.38, p < 0.001).  Fig.  5 illustrates the proportion of fixations, as estimated by this 
model, by AOI in two segments of interest corresponding to alternative mappings made by a 
reliable and an unreliable speaker.  As can be seen from this figure, the distribution of fixations 
towards objects and speakers was closely associated with speakers’ prior behavior.  We 
conducted post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the lsmeans function of the R package 
“lsmeans” (Lenth, 2016).  Children looked more at the reliable speaker’s face compared to the 
unreliable speaker in the segment in which the reliable speaker pointed at the novel word 
referent (β= 0.12, t=3.92, p<0.001). 
No such difference was detected in the segment in which it was the unreliable speaker 
who pointed at the novel word referent (β= 0.01, t=-0.16, p=0.99).  Children looked more at 
the object shown by the reliable speaker, as compared to the other object when this speaker 
pointed at it (β=0.31, t=9.82, p<0.001).  However, they did not display such a preference in the 
unreliable speaker segment (β=0.05, t=1.75, p=0.29). 
Finally, recall that children in the ASD group can be expected to exhibit a pattern of 
fixation distribution in two segments of interest that is different from children in the TD and 
DLD groups.  To assess this possibility, we considered a model containing AOI, segment and 
group interaction, but this triple interaction did not improve the fit relative to the model with 
the AOI × segment interaction (χ2(11) = 13.05, p = 0.52). 
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To sum up, we found that children in all groups performed above chance in Task 1 and 
children’s performance in this task correlated with verbal and non-verbal IQ.  Children in all 
groups preferred to encode novel word-referent pairs following cues offered by reliable 
speakers.  Furthermore, by exploring patterns of attention allocation in a word-learning 
situation with conflicting testimony provided by a previously accurate and inaccurate speaker 
we detected a significant AOI × Segment interaction, which indicates that children’s visual 
attention was determined by speakers’ prior accuracy.  Children with ASD tracked speakers’ 
responses in the test trial in the same way as children in both DLD and TD groups, suggesting 
that children with ASD may avoid learning from inaccurate speakers. 
TASK 2 
In this task, we coded as More Reliable the segment corresponding to a demonstration 
performed by a speaker who could show a correct familiar object without being systematically 
helped by the puppet, while the segment of a speaker who was systematically assisted by the 
puppet was coded as Less Reliable.   
First, we analyzed the distribution of children’s responses in the test trial.  Responses of 
one child in the TD group, of five children in the DLD group and of four children in the ASD 
group were not registered in the end of the test trial due to technical errors or because children 
exceeded a 15 sec interval to make their decision.  Seventeen over 19 children in the TD group, 
13 over 28 in the DLD group and 12 over 21 children in the ASD group selected the correct 
object.  Performance of children in the TD group demonstrated their preference for an object 
shown by a more reliable speaker (p=0.01, binomial test).  Children in both ASD and DLD 
groups failed to demonstrate such preference, and performed at chance in the task.  We further 
compared the distribution between groups with Fisher’s exact test for count data and found that 
distribution of responses in the TD group significantly differed from those in DLD and ASD 
groups (p=0.01).   
We were further interested in how individual differences in age, receptive vocabulary 
and non-verbal IQ might relate to the task performance.  We fitted these variables to the GLM 
models.  Analyses revealed significant main effects of group (χ2 (2) = 9.19, p =0.01), of 
receptive vocabulary (χ2 (1) = 3.86, p =0.04) and of non-verbal IQ score (χ2 (1) = 11.51, p 
<.001).  No effect of age was detected (χ2 (1) = 0.52, p =0.46).  Next, we investigated whether 
group effect was detectable while controlling for individual differences in children’s receptive 
vocabulary and non-verbal IQ.  A model with added group variable did not differ significantly 
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from the model with only receptive vocabulary and non-verbal IQ as predictors (χ2(2) = 3.20, 
p =0.20).  As it can be seen from the summary of this model in Table 2, non-verbal IQ emerged 
as a unique predictor of children’ selectivity. 
Next, we explored the pattern of children’s attention allocation in the test trial for the two 
segments of interest (viz.  mappings by the More and the Less Reliable speakers).  Sufficient 
quantity of gaze data for each segment of interest (>70%) in Task 2 was available for 16 
children in the TD group (M=96.5, sd =8.3), 18 children in the DLD group (M=93.6, sd=15.2) 
and 18 children in the ASD group (M=89.4, sd= 12.9).  Fig.  6 displays the mean distribution 
of proportions of fixations to objects and speakers in the segments of interest of the test trial in 
Task 2. 
We fitted fixation duration proportions as predicted values in linear mixed models with 
including by-participant random intercepts and with AOI, segment and group as predictors.  
Model comparisons revealed a significant effect of AOI (χ2 (3) = 215.09, p < 0.001) but no AOI 
× segment interaction (χ2 (3) = 3.11, p = 0.37).  The absence of interaction AOI × segment in 
Task 2 clearly revealed a different pattern of fixations to speakers’ faces and objects from what 
we observed in Task 1.  The allocation of visual attention was not directly influenced by the 
identity of the speaker in the same way as in Task 1.  In Task 2 children paid more attention to 
the face of the active speaker and to the object she was pointing at, even when the active speaker 
was the less reliable speaker. 
We further evaluated whether distribution of gazes across AOI could be predicted by 
group.  The interaction AOI × group significantly improved the fit of the model built with only 
the AOI factor (χ2(6) = 40.98, p < 0.001).  No triple interaction AOI × segment × group (χ2 (11) 
= 7.74, p=0.73) was detected.  We then conducted post-hoc pairwise comparisons of the 
maximal model (AOI and AOI × group interaction as fixed effects); the effects of this model 
are plotted in Fig.  7.  Children in the ASD group attended significantly more to the indicated 
object than the children in the TD group (β=0.15, t=3.80, p<0.001) and children in the DLD 
group (β=0.15, t=3.83, p<0.001).  By contrast, they looked less at the face of the Active speaker 
compared to TD children (β=-0.15, t=-3.66, p<0.001).  The same tendency in attending less to 
the active speaker’s face in the ASD group was observed in comparison with the DLD group, 
but failed to reach significance (β=-0.08, t=-2.06, p=0.08).  There was no difference between 
TD and DLD groups in the amount of fixation on the faces of active speakers (β=-0.05, t=-
1.66, p=0.21) or on the objects indicated by them (β=0.00, t=0.14, p=0.98).  Proportions of 
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fixations towards the speaker who was not acting, and the other object did not significantly 
differ between groups. 
Summing up, while in Task 1, attention allocation patterns during word-mappings 
performed by two speakers was clearly influenced by the previous accuracy of speakers, no 
such pattern robustly emerged in Task 2.  There was, however, a difference between children 
with ASD and both TD and DLD groups regarding fixations to active speakers and to the 
objects that they indicated.  Children in the ASD group were more attracted by objects and less 
by speaker’s faces compared to TD and DLD groups in this task.  These results are consistent 
with the results of previous studies that reported diminished attention to social stimuli in ASD.  
Note, however, that children in all groups were attentive to the demonstration made by both 
speakers as they were mostly attracted by the objects indicated by active speakers.  Therefore, 
children in the ASD group did display sensitivity to the cues provided by active speakers, as 
they followed speakers’ pointing in the same way as the children in TD and DLD groups.   
DISCUSSION 
This is the first comparative study of selective social learning in children with and 
without autism.  It is also the first study to explore the dynamics of children attention allocation 
to referents and speakers’ faces during word-object mapping performed by previously accurate 
and inaccurate speakers.  Several findings are particularly noteworthy and may shed light on 
the development of selective trust.   
In Task 1, children in all groups proved sensitive to the contrast between accurate and 
inaccurate speakers, as they favored the word-object mapping provided by a previously 
accurate speaker over that made by an inaccurate speaker.  Second, not only was speakers’ 
reliability encoded in children’s decisions on how to map words onto objects; eye-tracking data 
were also distributed according to the speakers’ previous accuracy.  Moreover, the distribution 
of children’s fixations revealed that prior accuracy of a speaker was already taken into 
consideration when children observed speakers’ mappings and before they made their own 
referent choice.  This distribution was affected by the speaker’s identity in a comparable way 
across the three groups: children focused their attention on the face and the object shown by a 
reliable speaker when s/he was giving her answer, but they did not follow the answer of a 
previously inaccurate speaker and explored the second available object during that speaker’s 
demonstration.   
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Two competing accounts explaining early children’s sensitivity to the accuracy of 
speakers’ testimony were evoked in the Introduction.  Some scholars argue that early selective 
learning is built on children’s ability to interpret speaker’s behaviors as proxies for underlying 
mental states.  Others hold that selective learning relies on a less sophisticated associative 
mechanism.  Under the latter model, children exhibit sensitivity to speakers’ accuracy by 
avoiding informational sources that previously demonstrated unexpected or abnormal 
behavior.  Our eye-tracking data revealed that children in all groups tend to pay less attention 
to word mappings produced by a previously inaccurate speaker — even before children had to 
make their own lexical choice.  Such a pattern of reduced attention to the cues provided by an 
inaccurate speaker is consistent with a dichotomous surface trait-attribution mechanism 
(conventional vs.  unconventional speaker’s behavior).   
We also found that this pattern of attention distribution, in Task 1, was shared by children 
in ASD, DLD and TD groups.  Moreover, children in all groups displayed the same preference 
for objects shown by accurate speakers.  Recall that socio-pragmatic accounts of selective 
learning would predict that children with ASD should not distinguish between reliable and 
unreliable information sources, owing to impaired mentalizing abilities.  Contrary to such a 
prediction, we found that children with ASD adjusted their attention to social cues in word-
learning situations according to speaker’s accuracy.   
Our results can be interpreted in two different ways.  First, one could surmise that 
children with ASD create epistemic models of speakers and thus demonstrate better social 
understanding than previously thought.  However, such an interpretation is not supported by 
robust empirical evidence that children with ASD fail to track and assess mental states of 
others.  Second, one may argue that our results rather converge with a conservative model of 
selective learning.  According to this line of thought, children do not need to make inferences 
about speakers’ knowledge state in our Task 1, as they can exhibit social selectivity by simply 
avoiding cues from inaccurate sources that showed very unconventional behavior.  There is no 
reason to believe that such an associative mechanism is not preserved in ASD.  On the contrary, 
even rather young infants on the spectrum are able to detect simple rule-based contingencies 
(Bhat, Galloway, & Landa, 2010; Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and may encode word-referent 
pairs by associating word forms with a speaker’s gaze cues, as was discussed in the 
Introduction.  Although performance in the task was not predicted by a group membership, we 
found that it correlated with verbal and non-verbal IQ skills suggesting that such an 
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unsophisticated trait-attribution mechanism still requires certain level of overall general mental 
functioning.   
We thus believe that our results are in line with the idea that children may rely on simple 
associative process when deciding about the credibility of the informational source in tasks in 
which trust decisions can be based on simple trait-attribution heuristic.  Both the performance 
above chance by all groups of children and the eye-tracking data supported this conclusion.  
Crucially, we also found that children with ASD could use social cues flexibly by preferring 
accurate sources of information to inaccurate ones; however, such flexibility is probably not 
grounded in a rich pragmatic process that draws on our ability of interpreting speakers’ 
knowledge states but is underpinned by an unsophisticated process of dichotomous trait-
attribution. 
A more complex picture emerges from children’s performance in Task 2.  Recall that in 
this task, speakers identified familiar objects correctly but differed on how they could achieve 
their responses; one speaker was consistently assisted by a puppet, while the other speaker 
answered correctly with no help.  Some results from this task corroborate the idea that 
atypically developing children may fail to critically evaluate the competence of speakers, as 
only TD children were found to perform above chance.  However, group effect disappeared 
once non-verbal IQ was added as a covariate in the tested generalized linear model of children’s 
choices.  It thus possible that TD children capability of drawing inferences from the speakers’ 
behavior in this task is primarily associated with the fact that they outperformed children in the 
clinical groups on general reasoning skills as measured by non-verbal IQ tests.   
Therefore, it is likely that, in Task 2, those children who failed to use the information 
about speakers’ reliability did so because of weaker general inference-making abilities.  
However, given that children in the ASD group and in the DLD group had lower non-verbal 
IQ at the group level, the range of scores in the subgroup analyses was restricted, reducing its 
sensitivity.  Some available evidence suggest that TD children as young as 4-year-old display 
selective learning in the similar contexts (Einav & Robinson, 2011).  A question for further 
research is whether younger TD children, with non-verbal IQ skills in the same range as those 
of children with ASD or DLD, would perform at chance in this task and whether non-verbal 
IQ skills predict selectivity in social learning outcome in a large sample of young TD children. 
Interestingly, TD children were found to prefer surface trait cues such as attractiveness 
(Bascandziev & Harris, 2014), physical force (Fusaro et al., 2011) or in-group membership 
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with a speaker (Elashi & Mills, 2014) to the more relevant information about demonstrated 
expertise when judging about speakers’ reliability.  It has been suggested that these difficulties 
are associated with immature executive functioning skills: children fail to inhibit salient 
appearance cues and consequently fail to process more relevant information on speakers’ 
situational knowledgeability (Hermes, Behne, Bich, Thielert, & Rakoczy, 2018).  Notably, 
these studies reveal the importance of taking into account children’s general cognitive 
resources in tasks on social trust. 
Yet, surprisingly few studies have addressed the question of how individual differences 
in general reasoning skills may affect children’s ability to identify reliable informational 
sources.  It is likely that individual differences in reasoning skills may strongly influence 
children’s epistemic vigilance and should be accounted for along with other factors.  Moreover, 
general reasoning skills may contribute to the development of rational trust, beyond 
mentalizing skills that are usually evoked as predictors of children’s selectivity.  As we already 
pointed out above, in complex selective learning tasks children need both to collect the 
information about reliability from speakers’ prior behavior and then apply this information to 
decide whether utterances by this speaker should be ignored or not.  Interestingly, in a study 
by Mills & Elashi (2014), which explored individual (and not only developmental) differences 
in the ability to identify distorted claims in a sample of TD children aged between 6 and 9, 
mentalizing abilities correlated with the accuracy of children’s responses, but only age and 
general IQ skills were found to uniquely predict children’s ability to identify distortion. 
Even though our results show that general reasoning abilities play important role in the 
development of rational trust, future research will be needed to establish other aspects of 
cognitive and social development that may explain why children with ASD and children with 
DLD failed to select more reliable informational sources.  This may be achieved by measuring 
social-pragmatic skills and by increasing the number of testing trials in order to gain in 
sensitivity and reliability of subsequent analyses. 
Nevertheless, two important findings from the eye-tracking dataset in Task 2 are worth 
emphasizing.  First, children have not displayed the same pattern of avoiding demonstration 
provided by less accurate speakers as in Task 1.  The fact that eye-tracking data patterns in this 
task do not depend on speakers’ prior behavior in any group suggests that children were not 
using speakers’ models directly while attending to speakers’ mappings.  This observation 
supports the idea that different process may be involved in social selective learning tasks in 
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different contexts.  Consequently, while children directly avoid cues offered by speakers that 
have previously displayed unusual behavior of misidentifying common objects, their attention 
does not seem to be directly affected by the more subtle difference in speakers’ degree of 
expertise.  This strongly suggests that a more sophisticated process is required to apply the 
information on speakers’ potential credibility during word-object mapping in Task 2.   
The second key finding of Task 2 is the increased proportion of attention allocated to 
objects by children in the ASD group, as compared to both DLD and TD groups.  Our analyses 
of gazes directed to speakers’ faces and objects revealed that participants from all three groups 
preferentially gaze towards the object that was indicated by the active speaker.  However, 
whereas this object captured almost the entirety of the visual attention span of children with 
ASD, attention of children in the TD and the DLD groups was also attracted by the face of the 
active speaker.  Although in our task, the speakers’ faces did not contain information that could 
be used to evaluate reliability, the fact that children in the ASD group were less attracted to 
faces may still have important implications for the development of selective trust.  In many 
learning contexts, informants’ faces enclose cues allowing to understand their deceptive intent, 
their degree of confidence and uncertainty, or demonstrate an ironic intent.  If children with 
ASD do not explore faces for a sufficient amount of time, they may fail to learn to identify 
these cues.  Consequently, they may not be able to use these cues to assess reliability of 
speakers and accuracy of information that they convey.  The question of whether reduced 
interest to faces affects the ability to trust and distrust selectively in ASD is another topic that 
clearly merits further investigation.  Additionally, future studies may address the question of 
whether diminished attention to the speakers’ faces in similar tasks is associated with the 
severity of autistic symptoms.   
Our results demonstrate that children with ASD can use speaker’ prior accuracy in tasks 
on social selective learning.  We have argued that these findings support the following 
theoretical conclusions.  First, children may learn selectively using simple associative heuristic 
rather than sophisticated inference-based mechanism: they directly avoid information provided 
by previously inaccurate speaker, as demonstrated by the eye-tracking data collected during 
speakers’ demonstration of mappings for novel words.  This pattern of attention allocation was 
the same across three groups of children (with ASD, with DLD and TD).  Next, explicit 
responses indicated that children in the ASD, DLD and TD groups displayed strong preference 
for the mappings provided by the previously accurate speaker.  Finally, a pattern of attention 
allocation associated with speaker’s previous accuracy has not been detected in a learning 
23 
AN EYE-TRACKING STUDY OF SELECTIVE TRUST DEVELOPMENT  
situation in which both speakers provided accurate mappings for familiar labels but differed on 
how they could achieve such an accuracy.  Children in two clinical groups but not in the TD 
group performed at chance in this latter task; however, non-verbal IQ score also predicted 
mapping choices of all tested children.  Since children with ASD and children with DLD had 
lower non-verbal IQ compared to the TD group, it is hard to decide whether children’s 
performance in this task is uniquely associated with general causal inferencing abilities or 
whether it is also associated with other group related factors, such as mentalizing abilities.   
The eye-tracking method used in this study, with its emphasis on exploring children’s 
processing of testimony, may be fruitfully applied to further investigation of how children 
process online information provided by speakers with different degree of credibility in tasks 
on selective trust.  Finally, beyond its theoretical value, research on the development of the 
mechanisms supporting the ability to endorse reliable and to ignore unreliable informational 
sources has important practical implications.  Our society is increasingly overloaded with 
information, and it is crucial to ensure that children with and without ASD develop epistemic 
vigilance.  Our research suggests that both general reasoning abilities and attention to social 
cues may influence development of rational trust in children with ASD and thus could become 
a potential focus for future educational intervention.    
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics in ASD, DLD and TD groups 
 
Group ASD (n=25; 7 female) 
Mean (SD) 
(range) 
DLD (n=32; 12 female) 
Mean (SD) 
(range) 






(4,1 – 9,0) 
7,3 (1,3) 
(5,1 – 9,4) 
7,1 (1,6) 
(4,1 – 8,8) 
Non-verbal IQ  92.66 (14.11) 
(71 – 120) 
96.03(11.59) 
(70 – 119) 
109.54 (10.02) 
(78 – 126) 
Vocabulary score  87.4 (20.6) 
(65 -124) 
94.65 (15.2) 
(66 – 113) 
113.63 (15.88) 
(95 – 136) 
ADOS total score 14.0 (4.6) 




NA 2.6 (2.3) 
(0 – 7) 
1.6 (1.3) 
(0 – 6) 
ADI-R 
Communication 
NA 3.2 (1.7) 
(0 – 8) 
0.9 (0.9) 





NA 0.5 (0.5) 
(0 – 2) 
0.4 (0.5) 
(0 – 1) 
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Figure 1.Structure of the scenario used in Task 1.  A) scenario of one of three familiarization 
trials; B) Test trial for which eye-tracking data were analyzed.  The original instructions are 
translated from French 
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Figure 2.  Scenario of two familiarization trials in task 2.  A) trial with a more reliable 
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Figure 3.  Screenshot of a test trial video with highlighted areas of interest 
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Figure 4.  Task1.  Mean proportion of fixations durations across four AOIs per segment, by 
group.  Error bars display SEM 
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Figure 5.  Task1.  Estimated proportion of fixations across AOI in two segments 
corresponding to word-object mappings by a reliable and by an unreliable speaker.  Vertical 
bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2. 
Fixed effects in a general linear model fitting accuracy of children’s response in Task2 
Effect β SE z-value p 
Intercept (ASD group) -4.45 2.27 -1.96  
Non-verbal IQ score 0.05 0.02 2.11 0.03* 
Receptive vocabulary .006 0.01 0.38 0.70 
ASD compared to DLD -0.45 0.62 -0.72 0.46 
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Figure 6.  Task 2.  Mean proportions of fixations durations across four AOI per segment, par 
group.  Error bars display SEM 
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Figure 7.  Estimated proportion of fixations across AOI par group in Task 2.  Vertical bars 
correspond to 95% confidence intervals 
 
